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. ,} ,/. /' 
the seope of the forfeIture clause lof awll}] may by 'some 
hook or crook' escape the penalty of .fo\;,'iture.'· To hold 
tha intestacy resulted as to tb.e'income/ 'om the trust estate 
upo A'¥lele's forfeiture thereof, .t A ele is entitled to 
take t ~eq.uest provide<;1d~ th, ,,~Iitest Cla,'l1,S e ($1.00), and 
that she" s n~vertheles,s'" entltl-ed<io take' o~ half the trust 
income ~s . nh~~~ ~~'1aw,wolJ,ld appe~r '0 constitute such 
an "artl1icla dIstl1)HlOn" a~d "qUlbbhqi" to the end that 
she take a sha '1\, the estate despite .d~e testatrix' clearly" 
declared intent" that .the forfeiture-/ clause erate as to 
"any person, ,bet <1l::'beneficiaryJimder tsWill or/llot 
mentioned ein, " , " , th,at ,any ~uch per~, OuId, r,eceive 
only $1.00 '~n lieu/ Qf t 'provision whl~ ~ have ~ade. or 
which I glit hayemade n ein ,for sucJ:vPeon so ~6ntesting 
or objec g" ,. '"ii, '''', / / Thecr~e /6'f,'~ist!ibution , "·eve~ed,jwithj.directions U> 
the pate !'lOliI1 t9proceed/witllea min~tration of the 
estat in a/l;rtanper' not in ¢'on1lic ( ·t the/views expressed I 
in this opinion,(piid in all !proc" am ~Mt~in the interests 
of the i,?~nt contingent ~~tnai~erme ~,,' in~Iv~d the C?urt 
shall r,.eq'111re that such mUlo~appear y a uardlan ad btem 
and ~-()iinsel whose intereWare not in conflict with those of 
the ,{,vards. --~bson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, f,(J and Spence, J., concurred. 
[ Crim. No. 5243. In Bank. Jan. 22, 1952.] 
In re O. D. JAMES, on Habeas Corpus. 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Petition-Excuse for Dela,. in Filing.-Even 
if strict requirement of diligence in coram nobis proceedings 
were a prerequisite of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner's 
affidavit and record of a coram nobis proceeding present 
a satisfactory explanation of delay in filing a petition for 
habeas corpus where it appears therein that because of his 
ignorance petitioner did not realize that he had any grounds 
for attacking a judgment of conviction until long after the 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 51; [2] Habeas 
Corpus, § 8; [3-5J Criminal Law, § 101; [6] Criminal Law, § 163; 
[1] Criminal Law, § 1000; [8,9] Criminal Law, § 110; [10] Habeas 
Corpus, § 18; [11J Habeas Corpus, § 68. 
'\ ) 
Jan. 1952] IN RE JAMES 303 
[38 C.2d 302; 240 P.2d 596) 
time for appeal had expired, that because he could hardly 
read or write he had no friends or acquaintances with whom 
he could correspond, that he was dependent solely on prison 
officials for any move in his behalf, and that finally, througb 
the aid of a chaplain, he was able to get certain people inter-
ested in his case and thus receive competent legal advice. 
[2] ld.-Grounds-Violation of Constitutional Rights.-While a 
writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a substitute for an 
appeal, the writ will lie if fundamental constitutional rights 
of the petitioner have been violated. 
[3] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Right of 
an accused to counsel is a fundamental constitutional right 
which has been carefully guarded by the courts. 
[4] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseI.-Due process clause 
of Fourteenth Ameqdment of United States Constitution re-
quires counsel to be furnished to the accused in capital cases. 
[5] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseI.-A state court is 
required to initiate an inquiry into the desire of the accused 
to be represented by counsel, to inquire into the ability of the 
accused to procure counselor, in the event of the inability of 
the accused to procure counsel, to assign competent counsel 
to conduct his defense. 
[6] ld.-Preliminary Examination-Rights of Defendant-Aid of 
Counsel.-Where one accused of murder is not represented on 
the preliminary hearing by counsel, the failure of the magis-
trate to inform him of his right thereto is a violation of 
Const., art. I, § 8, and Pen. Code, § 858. 
[7] ld.-Matters Preceding Sentence-Determination of Degree of 
01fense.-Where defendant has pleaded guilty to a murder 
charge, the court is required to take evidence for the purpose of 
determining the degree of the crime. (Pen. Code, § 1192.) 
[8] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.-Assuming 
that a plea of guilty in a capital case could be received in 
1944 (prior to amendment of Pen. Code, § 1018) from a de-
fendant who did not appear with counsel, a plea of guilty in 
such case did not imply a waiver of the right to counsel. 
[9] ld. - Rights of Accused - Aid of Counsel- Waiver.-Court 
cannot accept a waiver of counsel from one accused of a 
serious public offense without first determining that he under-
stands the nature of the charge, the dements of the offens!', 
the pleas and defenses which may be available, or the punish-
ments which may be exacted. 
[3] See CaI.Jur., Criminal Law, § 83; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§ 167. 
) 
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[10] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Violation of Constitutional Rights. 
-A conviction of first degree murder will be set aside on 
habeas corpus whert' defendant's conlStitutional rights were 
violated because he was not informcd of his right to counspl 
when firlSt brought before the magistrate, where a mere 
statelllt'nt that he wished to plt'ud guilty was insufficient to 
show a waiver of the constitutional guarantet', and whcre, ill 
"iew of evidence indicating that the crime was less than first 
degrt'e IllUl'der, it was unlikely that any attorney representing 
him would have advised him to plead guilty to the murder 
charge. 
[11] Id.-Judgment-Discharge and Rema:!ld.-Although a judg-
ment of conviction will be set alSide on habeas corpus for 
wrongful denial of defendant's right to counsel, he will be 
remanded to the custody of the sheriff of the county for 
further proceedings where he is still subject to trial on the 
charge made against him. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody. Writ granted; petitioner discharged from custody 
of prison warden and committed to custody of county sheriff 
for further proceedings. 
Adams & Reynolds for Petitioner. 
Edmund O. Browll, Attorney General, and Clarence A. 
Linn, Assistant Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner, O. D. James, an inmate of San 
Quentin State Prison. seeks a writ of habeas corpus. He 
pleaded guilty to a charge of murder. The court determined 
that the crime was first degree murder and sentenced peti-
tioner to imprisonment for life. Petitioner now contends that 
his constitutional rights were violated and his plea of guilty 
vitiated because he was not given the aid of counsel. 
Petitioner's version of the events leading to the homicide 
are set forth in his affidavit. On December 2, 1944, a number 
of farm workers were engaged in a dice game at the canteen 
on the ranch where they worked. Petitioner and Chat'lie 
Thomas, the decedent, wt're watching the game awaiting their 
turns with the dice. Petitioner placed 55 cents in front of 
him on the table in anticipation of hazarding that sum when 
he gained possession of the dice. Thomas, who had not pre-
[11] Discharge on habeas corpus after conviction as affecting 
claim or plea of former jeopardy, note, 97 A.L.R. 160. See, also, 
Cal..Tur., Habeas Corpus, § 56 j Am . .Tur., Hnbens Corpus, § 154. 
\ 
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vionsly wagered any money and had no claim to the coins. 
suddenly snatched them. Petitioner demalliled that Thomas 
\'eturn the money. 'rhey argued for about a minute and 
Thomas then ran out a side door. At this point a bell rang 
summoning the workers to supper. 'Vith the triple purpose 
of avoiding the rush for the front door, responding to the 
supper bell, and looking for Thomas, petitioner walked out 
the side door previously used by Thomas. Thomas was wait-
iug outside, and petitioner again demanded his 55 cents. 
Thomas thereupon struck petitioner on the head with a bef'r 
bottle, stunning him and inflicting a bloody scalp wound. 
Petitioner staggered back and reached down to pick up his 
cap. As he did so he heard a shout" Look out" and saw that 
Thomas was bearing down upon him with a knife. In the 
struggle that followed, petitioner's hand was slashed and is 
now marked by a large scar. He seized the knife and struck 
Thomas in the neck, killing him. After his wounds were 
attended to, petitioner retired to his quarters to await thf' 
arrival of law enforcement officers. 
It is unnecessary to decide whether this version of the 
homicide is true. It is set forth simply to show that petitioner' 
had a defense, which, if wholly or partially believed by the 
trier of fact on a plea of not guilty, would lead to acquittal 
or at most to a conviction of a lesser crime than first degree 
murder. 
Petitioner· appeared without counsel at the preliminan-
hearing on December 12, 1944. in the justice's court and 
was not informed of his right to counsel. l Bill Watson. a 
worker on the ranch, testified that Thomas and petitioner 
had been at the dice table. that Thomas picked up some money 
from the table, and that Thomas and petitioner had an argu-
ment oyer some money and "something about point eight." , 
As to what happened thereafter, he testified as follows: 
"Q .... What did they do after you got in there? A. Well. 
the bf'll rung for Suppf'r. Everybody was going out to eat. 
so they went out the door and I went out th<' door. Q. ""'hic·h 
door did they go out? A. The little door there on the side. . . . 
Q. 'Which one went Ollt the door first? A. Charlie [Thomas] . 
. . . Q. Did he go out the side door in a hurry or did he just 
walk out slowly? A. He went out in a hurry. Q. When he 
went out the side door in a hurry, did the defendant, O. D. 
"rHF. COtTRT: You hnn' 110 nttOTn('Y nt this tin\(', ha\'c ~'O\l? THY. 
DEFENDANT: No. THE COURT: All right. Pro('l'('d." 
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James, go out this same door? A. Yes, sir. He went outside. 
Q. How close behind Thomas was he when ,he went out the 
door? A. I don't know exactly. Q. Well, approximately. 
Approximate it. About how far behind him? A. Well, I told 
you the truth, I don't know, because they was going out to 
supper there, you know, so I couldn't tell how close he went out 
behind. Q. Did he go out in a hurry or did he just walk out 
casually' A. Well, when he went out the door, he was going 
out, he was just walking out. . . . Q. Did anybody else go out 
that side door? A. I didn't see nobody. I went out the front 
door there. . . . Q. Did you see Charlie Thomas at any time 
after he had gone out the side door? A. No, sir. Q. You never 
saw him again T A. Well, I seen him laying on the ground, 
after I walked across to the mess hall there. . . . Q. How long 
after he picked up the money was it that he left by the 
side door T A. About five minutes. Q. He stood there with 
the money in his hand five minutes before he left by the door T 
A. I think it was five minutes. I don't know. I didn't have 
no watch on me. Q. Well, as a matter of fact, did the de-
fendant here O. D. James follow the man Charlie Thomas, 
out the side door right away Y Did he go right out after he 
went out T A. I don't know whether he went right out behind 
him or not. All I know, he walked out the same door. Q. Was 
that about the same time? A. Shortly after." 
Felix Neal, another worker at the ranch, testified that he 
had been shooting the dice, that he made his point, which 
was eight, that he did not know anything about a side bet, 
that the argument started when Thomas grabbed some money 
from the table and that the argument continued for about 
five minutes. As to what happened thereafter, he testified 
as follows: "Q. Then what happened' A. Then they went 
out-well, before they went out, I walked out, I started to 
leave out of there, out of the room there. So they went out 
and I don't know what happened. Q. Where were the two 
men, Thomas and James when you left the eanteen' A. They 
was inside that little small room there. Q. They hadn't gone 
out yet' A. No. They started to leave out before I beat it 
out; I left out. Q. Which door did you go out' A. The front 
door. Q. Had they started to go out when you left? A. Well, 
they had-they looked like they was going out. Q. Do you 
know which door they headed for? A. No, sir. Q. Or started 
to go out, A. I didn't see them. Q. They started to go out. 
Who was going out first' A. Charlie. I think he started to 
go out, something like that. Q. Did this man James follow 
--) 
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him or not, do you know' A. Well, he went around the table 
there. That is when I left there. Q. Who went around the 
table T A. The defendant here. Q. Where was Thomas when 
the defendant went around the table. A. Thomas! Q. Yes. 
Charlie ThomaS. A. Charlie Thomas, oh, he was on this side 
of the table, close to the small heater they got there. Q. Where 
was James' On the same side of the table or the other side' 
A. On the other side of the table. Q. That is when you 
mean that James went around the tablet A. When he went 
around the table, that is when I left. Q. Why did you leave 
at that time' A. Well, because I was waiting for chow 
time. . . . Q. Well, then, Neal, when you shot the dice and 
made your point of 8, that is when Thomas grabbed the money, 
is that rightY A. Yes, sir. Q. Then there was an argument 
over it between Thomas and James' A. Well, I didn't-I , 
didn't understand if it was an argument, they made so much 
fUss there. Q. You called it an argument. A. It sounded like 
an argument about some money. Q. Is that when James went I 
around the tablet A. Yes, sir. Is this James here' Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. Q. He went around the table after Charlie' A. Yes. 
Q. Is that when you leftY A. Yes, sir, that is when I left. 
I left out the front door. Q. Did you see Charlie after that! 
A: No, sir, I didn't see him." 
Albert H. Lopez, constable of the township, testified that 
petitioner said that he had made a side bet with Thomas 
on the fall of the dice and that the argument was over the 
question whether Thomas had bet with or against the dice. 
Lopez further stated that immediately after the homicide, , 
petitioner told him what happened, giving substantially the 
same version as that set forth in petitioner's affidavit. No 
other witnesses testified, and petitioner did not testify in his 
own behalf. 
At the arraignment in the superior court, on December 15th, 
the court asked petitioner if he would like to have a lawyer 
and petitioner replied that he would like to have one.2 Peti-
'''Q. Now, is O. D. James your true name? A. Yes. Q. Are you 
represented by counsel? A.. No. Q. By a lawyer? A. No. Q. Do JOu 
want a lawyer to represent you? A. I would like to have one. Q. Do you 
have any money to pay for a lawyer? A. No, not yet. Court: Well 
Mr. Oziaa [an attorney present at the proceedings] will you represent 
him for the purpose of arraignment with, however, the right to with· 
drawal if you wish? Oziaa: Yes .••• Gibbs: If you are going to appoint 
an attorney that should be done before the case is set. It might not be 
an agreeable date for the attorney .•.• Court: The matter will be 
continued one week from today for the appointment of an attorney." 
) 
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tioller then pleaded not guilty. The court continued the matter 
one week for the appointment of an attorney. 
Four days later Melvin K. Gibbs, Assistant District At-
torney, and petitioner, again without counsel, appeared in 
the superior court. Nothing was said by Gibbs or the court 
about the order of continuance to December 22d, and no order 
was entered advancing the case on the calendar. Gibbs told 
the court that petitioner had sent a note asking to see him 
and stating that he wanted to plead guilty. The trial court 
asked petitioner if he wished to plead guilty and he replied 
that he, did. The court then permitted him to withdraw his 
plea of not guilty and to plead guilty. Gibbs then stated: 
"If the Court please, it might-your Honor .might be able 
now to fix the degree, that will take but a moment. In brief 
the fact~ are that this defendant and the deceased were 
playing dice at Griffen Ranch No.2. Some altercation arose 
over the fact that the deceased person grabbed the money 
from the dice game-:-that money did not belong to this de-
fendant by the wayS-this defendant started after him, and 
then the deceased man ran out the side door, followed by 
the defendant. The defendant stated to me that then and there 
he dropped his hat and as he reached to get it, the deceased, 
Charlie Thomas pulled a knife on him; that this defendant 
took the knife away from him, and thereupon proceeded 
to stab him, and that stab wound caused the death. There is 
no doubt in my mind but what it is murder in the first degree. 
But those are the facts as I have outlined them, and including 
the statement the defendant made." Gibbs then asked peti-
tioner "Did you hear what I said T Is that about right?" 
Petitioner replied "That is right." The trial court accepted i 
Gibbs' claim that the degree of the crime was first degree 
murder, and the case was continued for determination of 
the sentence. 
On December 22d petitioner' came into court for sentence, 
again without counsel. The court informed petitioner of the 
several steps that had occurred in the proceedings, omitting, 
however, petitioner's request for the appointment of counsel. 
the continuance of the case for that purpose, and the special 
appearance on the 19th and the change of plea. The court 
fixed the punishment at life imprisonment. The court then 
asked petitioner questions about his education, family back-
ground, military record, and work history. 
On March 3, 1950, counsel for petitioner appeared in the 
aThere was no evidence that the money did not belong to petitioner. 
,J 
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Superior Court of Fresno County before the same trial judge 
who had presided at the Dece~ber, 1944, proceedings for 
hearing on a motion in the nature of a petition for a writ 
of error cot'am nobis. The trial Judge denied the motion. On 
September 18, 1950, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth 
District, affirmed the order of the trial court on the ground 
that petitioner's' contentions could not be determined on a 
petition for a writ of error coram nobis. (People v. James, 
99 CalApp.2d 476 [222 P.2d 117].) On July 17, 1951, peti-
tioner filed an original petition for habeas corpus in this court. 
(Cal. Co~t., art. VI, § 4; Pen. Code, § 1475.) The petition 
appeared meritorious, and we entered an order to show cause 
why the relief prayed for should not be granted. The attorney I 
general has filed the record on appeal in the coram nobis 
proceeding; which'includes a full transcript of the proceedings 
upon the ori~inal commitment. ' ,-
The attorney general, relying on People v. Adamson, 34 
Cal.2d 320, 327 [210 P.2d 13] and People v. Shorb, 32 Cal.2d 
502, 513 [197 P.2d 330], contends that the petition should 
be dismissed without consideration of its merits for inade-
quate explanation of the delay in filing it. Neither case 
is applicable, for both involved coram nobis proceedings. 
[1] Even if the strict requirement of diligence in coram nobis 
proceedings were a prerequisite of the writ of' habeas corpus, 
petitioner's affidavit and the record of the 1950 coram nobis 
proceeding present a satisfactory explanation of the delay, 
It appears therein that because of his' ignorance, petitioner 
did not realize that he had any grounds for attacking the judg-
ment until long after the time for appeal had expired, that 
because he could hardly read or write he had no friends or 
acquaintances in the outside world with whom he could 
correspond or who could press his cause, that he was dependent 
solely on the officials at the prison for any move in his behalf, 
and that finally, through the aid of a chaplain at the prisOn, 
he ,vas able to get the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People interested in his case and . thus 
receive cOJ;npetent legal advice. (See In re Jones, 88 Cal.App'. 
2d 167, 169 [198 P.2d 520].) . 
[2] The writ of habeas corpus may not be used as a sub-
stitute for an appeal, but if fundamental constitutional rights 
of the petitioner have been'violated the' writ will lie. (People 
v. Adams01l, 34 Cal.2d 320 [210 P.2d 13] ,'In re Mcaoy, 32 
Cal2d 73, 76 [194 P.2d 531] ; In re Wallace, 24 Cal.2d '933, 
938 [152 P.2d 1] ; In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488, 494, 507 [122 P.2d 
) 
/ 
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22].) [3] The right to counsel is a fundamental constitutional .. 
right, ,vhich has been carefully guarded by the courts of I 
this state. (In re McCoy, 32 Cal.2d 73 [194 P.2d 531] ; People 
v. Manchetti, 29 Ca1.2d 452, 458 [175 P.2d 533] j People v. 
Chesser, 29 Ca1.2d 815 [178 P.2d 761] j People v. Lanigan, 
22 Cal.2d 569 [140 P.2d 24, 148 A.L.R. 176] j In re Jones, 
88 Cal.App.2d 167 [198 P.2d 520] ; People v. Avilez, 86 Cal. 
App.2d 289 [194 P.2d 829] j People v. Zammora, 66 Cal.App. 
2d 166 [152 P.2d 180] j People v. McGarvy, 61 Cal.App.2d 
557 [142 P.2d 92] ; see earlier cases collected in 7 Cal.Jur. 
939, 973, 990.) 
The accused has the right in criminal prosecutions in 
any court whatever "to appear and defend, in person and i 
with counsel." (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) At the preliminary 
examination the magistrate must inform the accused of his 
right to counsel, ask him if he desires counsel, and allow 
him a reasonable time to send for counsel. If the felony 
charged is not punishable with death, the defendant may 
plead guilty to the offense at the preliminary examination 
in the presence of counsel. (Art. I, § 8.) These basic guaran-
tees are supplemented by many provisions of the Penal Code. 
When the defendant is brought before the magistrate, the 
latter" must immediately inform him . . . of his right to the 
aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings." (Pen. Code, 
§ 858.) "If the public offense charged is an offense not 
punishable with death . . . while the charge remains pending 
before the magistrate and when his counsel is present, the 
defendant may, with the consent of the magistrate and the 
district attorney or other counsel for the people, plead guilty 
to the offense charged. . . . The foregoing provisions of this 
section shall not be construed to authorize the receiving of 
a plea of guilty from any defendant not represented by 
counsel. " (Pen. Code, § 859a.) "If the defendant appears 
for arraignment without counsel, he must be informed by the 
court that it is his right to have counsel before being ar-
raigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. 
If he desires and is unable to employ counsel, the court must 
assign counsel to defend him." (Pen. Code, § 987.) In 1949, 
after the proce~dings in the present case, Penal Code, section 
1018, was amended to provide that no plea of guilty to a 
felony for which the maximum punishment is death shall be 
received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel. 
[4] The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
) 
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stated that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend· 
ment of the United States Constitution requires counsel to 
be furnished to the accused in capital cases. (Qllicksall v . 
. lIich1:gan, 339 U.S. 660, 666 [70 S.Ct. 910, 94 L.Ed. 1188]; 
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780 [69 S.Ct. 1247, 93 L.Ed. 
1686]; Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 [69 S.Ct. 
184, 93 L.Ed. 127]; Bute v. Illirw-is, 333 U.S. 640, 674 [68 
S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986] ; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 
474 [65 S.Ct. 363, 89 L.Ed. 398]; Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 
U.S. 485, 488 [65 S.Ct. 370, 89 L.Ed. 407] ; Powell v. A.labama, 
287 U.S. 45, 71 [53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527] ; 
22 So.Cal.L.Rev. 259.) [6] A state court is required "to 
initiate an inquiry into the desire of the accused to be repre· 
sented by counsel, to inquire into the ability of the accused 
to procure counsel or, in the event of the inability of the 
accused to procure counsel, to assign competent counsel to 
conduct his defense." (Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 674 
[68 S.Ct. 763, 92 L.Ed. 986].) 
[6] The record shows that petitioner was represented by 
counsel only for the purpose of arraignment and at no other 
stage of the proceedings. Thus, in clear violation of the 
express mandate of article I, section 8 of the California Con-
stitution and of Penal Code, section 858, petitioner was not 
informed of his right to counsel when first brought before 
the magistrate. Moreover, the trial court did not inform 
him of his right to counsel at the time it accepted his plea 
of guilty, or even ask him if he waived the right to counsel 
or if he no longer wished counsel as requested at the time 
of arraignment. Nor did the court inform him of the possible 
maximum penalty or of the possibility of there being different 
degrees of the crime charged. Petitioner, an illiterate farm 
laborer without previous encounters with the law or experi-
ence in the intricacies of criminal procedure, could hardly 
be expected to comprehend the possible offenses and various 
punishments involved in this homicide or to know how to 
weigh, let alone present, the defenses available thereto. The 
elements of murder and manslaughter, the distinctions be-
tween first and second degree murder and the principles 
governing defenses to charges of such crimes are often diffi-
cult even for experienced judges and skilled practitioners 
to apply. "The right to be heard would be, in many cases, 
of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard 
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has 
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small nnu SOIl!etilUe~ 110 Nkill in the sl'icuee of law. If charged 
with (~rilllc, hc is incapable, generally,. of determining for 
himst'lf whether the indictment is good 01' bad. He is un-
familillr with the rul('s of evidence. Left without the aid of 
l'ounsel he lllay be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
l·ondded upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant 
to tlw issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill 
anu knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though 
he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of 
l'olUlsel at e"el'Y step in the proceedings against him. Without 
it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction 
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 
If that be true of men of intelligence, how much more true is : 
it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble intellect." 
{lIr. Justice Sutherland in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 
li8-69 [53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527].) 
The record in this case is eloquent proof of the wisdom 
of the observation that "the guiding hand of counsel is 
needed lest the unwary concede that which only bewilderment 
or ignorance could justify or pay a penalty which is greater 
than the law of the State exacts for the offense which they 
in fact and in law committed." (Tonikins v. State of Missouri, 
:323 U.S. 485, 488 [65 S.Ot. 370, 89 L.Ed. 407].) Not only 
the record, but even Gibbs' statement to the court, indicates 
that the crime was less than murder in the first degree. It is ' 
difficult to believe that a lawyer representing petitioner 
would have advised petitioner to plead guilty to murder or 
pt'rmitted Gibbs' statement to go unchallenged. 
[7] When petitioner's plea of guilty was accepted by the 
trial court, the prosecution had yet to establish that he had 
a deliberate intent to kill when he struck Thomas. (Pen. Code, 
§§188, 189.) At no time did the court take any evidence 
for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime, as 
it was required to do (Pen. Code,§ 1192; People v. Mendez, 
2i Ca1.2d 20, 23 [161 P.2d 929] ; In re Hough, 24 Ca1.2d 522, 
534 [150 P.2d 448]; People v. Verdier, 96 Cal.App.2d 29 
[214 P.2d 433] ; In 1'e Hammond, 24 Cal.App.2d 18 [74 P;2d 
:308] ; People v. Hammond, 26 Cal.App.2d 145 [78 P.2d 1172]), 
but dependt'd solely upon the opinion of the Assistant District 
Attorney that it was murder in the first degree. There is no 
evidt'llce that this killing occurred during the commission of 
a felony, and the only evidence that might possibly indicate 
premeditation is that petitioner followed Thomas outside the 
canteen. 
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The attorney general, relying on In re Tedfm'd, 31 Cal.2d 
693 [192 P.2d 3], contends that by requesting to change his 
plea. petitioner impliedly waived his right to counsel and is 
therefore precluded from making his present contention that 
he was deprh'ed of his constitutional rights. Unlike petitioner, 
however, Tedford did not request counsel, nor was he charged 
with a capital offense. The record showed that he was fully 
aware of the nature of the proceedings and had an intelligent 
conception of the consequences of his act. 'Under these cir-
f'lImstances it was held that a plea of guilty was sufficient 
to waive the right to counsel. (In re Tedford, 31 Ca1.2d 693, 
695 r192 P.2d 3) ; In re Jingles, 27 Ca1.2d 496 p65 P.2d 12] ; 
People Y. Wan'cr, 93 Cal.App.2d 54, 57 [208 P.2d 724].) 
[8] Even if it is assumed that a plea of guilty in a capital 
('ase could be received at the time of petitioner's plea of 1944 
(before the amendment to Pen. Code, § 1018, supra) from 
a defendant who did not appear with counsel, it does not 
follow that in such a case a plea of guilty implied a waiver 
of the right to counsel. As the seriousness of the charge in-
ereases. a purported waiver must be scrutinized with cor-
responding care. If a eapital crime is ('harged, as herein, the 
mere statement that the accused wishes to plead guilty is 
not enough to show a waiver of the constitutional guarantee. 
[9] l\IoreoYer. the court ('annot accept a waiver of counsel 
from anyone ae('used of a serious public offense without first 
determining that he "understands the nature of the charge. 
the elements of the offense, the pleas and defenses which 
may be available. or the punishments which may be exaeted." 
(People Y. Chessrr. 29 Ca1.2d 815. 822 [178 P.2d 761] ; UvegeR 
'-. Pellllsyll'ania, 335 'U.S. 437, 440-441 [69 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Ed 
1271.) There was no attempt to make such a determination 
in this ease. The record shows that defendant was an itinerant 
farm hand. without formal edueation, without money, and 
e"idently without previous experience with courts. 
[10] RiJwe the procednre here wa.'! in dear violation of 
petitioner's ('ollstitutional rights, the conviction must be set 
aside. (111 rc .l[cCoy. 32 Cal.2d 73. 77 [194 P.2d 5311; In rc 
,Jolle.~. 88 Cal.App.2d 167 fI98 P.2d 520] ; Uveges v. Penn-
sylt·ania. 335 U.S. 437 [69 S.Ct. 184, 93 L.Bd. 127] ; Gibbs v. 
Burke. 337 U.S. 773 [69 S.Ct. 1247, 93 L.Ed. 1686].) 
[11] Petitioner contends that if the judgment is void, he 
"should be restored to his liberty." The eyidence at the pre-
liminary hearing, howe"er, was sufficient to justify the ('om-
) 
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mitting magistrate's concluding that a public offense had 
been committed and that there was reasonable cause to hold 
petitioner for trial. (Pen. Code, § 872; People v. McGee, 31 
Cal.2d 229, 234 [187 P.2d 706] ; People v. Nagle, 25 Ca1.2d 
216, 222 [153 P.2d 344].) The denial of petitioner's right 
to counsel did not serve to acquit him of the offense charged, 
and he is still subject to trial. (In re McCoy, supra, 32 Ca1.2d 
73, 77; see Pen. Code, §§ 799, 1486; cases collected in 97 
A.L.R. 160.) 
On oral argument the deputy attorney general stated 
that" an examination of the record convinces the Attorney 
General's office that manslaughter was the greatest crime 
committed by this Petitioner, and we are taking the laboring 
oar in calling the matter to the attention of )he Governor, 
asking for commutation of sentence to time served.' '. If peti-
tioner were convicted of manslaughter on a second trial, his 
confinement based upon the invalid 1944 judgment, together 
with any time credits for good conduct earned thereon (Pen. 
Code, § 2920), would be credited upon the new sentence for 
the same criminal act. (Pen. Code, § 2900.1.) 
The writ is granted, the return to the order to show cause 
shall stand as the return to the writ, and the petitioner is 
discharged from the custody of the warden at San Quentin 
and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Fresno County 
for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed 
in this opinion. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, 
.T., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-Upon the hearing of a motion here charac-
terized as "in the nature of a petition for a writ of error 
coram nobis," the superior court denied James any relief 
and that order was affirmed by the district court of appeal. 
(People v. James, 99 Ca1.App.2d 476 [222 P.2d 117J.) The 
facts upon which the present determination is based are taken 
from the record of that proceeding. I concur in the con-
'The petition alleges that the Adult Authority has also recommended 
commutation. "On April 21, 1949, the Adult Authority at its clemency 
meeting held at Sacramento considered your affiant's application for 
Commutation of Sentence and the said Adult Authority recommended to 
the Governor that Commutation of Sentence to reduce the offense of 
Murder first degree to Manslaughter be granted; that the eomplete 
file was returned to the Governor's office on April 25, 1949, with this 
recommendation, but as yet no aetion has been taken on this recom-
mendation. ' , 
